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OF CLUSTERS AND ASSUMPTIONS:
INNOVATION AS PART OF A FULL TRIPS
IMPLEMENTATION
Daniel Gervais*
INTRODUCTION
Studying the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS)' is fascinating for several reasons. Let me mention just two.
First, because TRIPS introduced a high(er) level of intellectual property
protection in a number of developing countries around the world, including
detailed rules on the enforcement of intellectual property before national
courts and customs authorities, it provided an opportunity to examine the
impact of the introduction of (property) rights on a variety of intangibles in
legal systems from which those rights were absent. This opened a
multilevel inquiry. Because the rules contained in TRIPS evolved mostly in
the West over two centuries, 2 an interesting question is whether, and if so
how, eighteenth-century European rules, updated in concert with other
Western nations until 1989, 3 can be successfully integrated into the social,
cultural, economic, and legal fabric of dozens of developing nations, and
how success is measured in that context. A specific branch of this analysis
focuses on the impact of the introduction of enforcement-related notions,
such as quia timet injunctions4 or destruction of potentially useful
counterfeit goods in judicial systems where such notions did not exist or
* Professor of Law and Director of the Technology & Entertainment Law Program,
Vanderbilt University School of Law.
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].
2. Both the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 305
[hereinafter Paris Convention], and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Berne Convention], were first drafted, negotiated, and revised in Western Europe, except, in
the case of the Paris Convention, for which the revision conference was held in Washington,
D.C., in 1911.
3. See DANIEL J. GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
11-19 (3d ed. 2008). For the most part, TRIPS encapsulates the norms that the demander
countries (the European Communities, Japan, and the United States) could agree on among
themselves as of late 1989.
4. A court order to prevent an action that has been threatened but has not yet violated
the plaintiff s rights. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 800 (8th ed. 2004).
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were even frowned upon.5  At the normative level, are critiques that
emphasize the fact that parallelism-namely the possibility of gradually
increasing intellectual property levels as the economy developed, an
approach used by most industrialized nations-was not an option for the
developing world well-founded? 6
A second reason is that TRIPS allows us to consider the impact of
high(er) levels of intellectual property protection on economic activity. The
welfare costs associated with the introduction of higher intellectual property
protection are well-known. For example, introducing patent rights in an
area in which they previously did not apply (e.g., pharmaceuticals) may
lead to steep price increases compared to products whose pricing does not
include any monopoly rent. This is what led to the adoption of two
important measures by the World Trade Organization (WTO), namely the
extension of the transitional period for least-developed nations7 to
implement pharmaceutical patent provisions of TRIPS until 2016,8 and the
adoption of a Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health,9 and later a formal
amendment to the agreement, 10 to allow developing countries to import
certain pharmaceuticals I I produced under an export compulsory license. 12
5. For example, TRIPS Article 46 provides that,
[i]n order to create an effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial authorities
shall have the authority to order that goods that they have found to be infringing
be, without compensation of any sort, disposed of outside the channels of
commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm caused to the right holder, or,
unless this would be contrary to existing constitutional requirements, destroyed.
TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 46 (emphasis added). The italicized exception was introduced to
reflect a rule in countries such as Brazil where destruction of otherwise useful goods is
allegedly unconstitutional. Indeed, the mandatory destruction of counterfeit goods, even
after infringing trademarks have been removed, is a value judgment that all may not share.
Such destruction prioritizes the possibility that the goods might be rebranded or otherwise
reenter the channels of commerce over the fact that they may have some use for these goods,
e.g., charitable organizations.
6. See Daniel J. Gervais, TRIPS & Development, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT 16 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007).
7. TRIPS distinguishes developing and least-developed nations. The latter group is
based on the United Nations list. See United Nations, List of Least Developed Countries,
http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
8. Council for TRIPS, Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 of the
Trips Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with
Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, IP/C/25 (June 27, 2002). In another decision, the
Council also decided that, "Least-developed country Members shall not be required to apply
the provisions of the Agreement, other than Articles 3, 4 and 5, until 1 July 2013, or until
such a date on which they cease to be a least-developed country Member, whichever date is
earlier." Council for TRIPS, Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66. ]for Least-
Developed Country Members, IP/C/40 (Nov. 30, 2005).
9. World Trade Organization [WTO] Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health, Nov. 20, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2.
10. WTO General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8,
2005).
11. See GERVAIS, supra note 3, at 65-69.
12. This is a derogation to Article 31(f) of TRIPS, which provides that products
manufactured under a compulsory license must be "predominantly for the supply of the
domestic market of the Member authorizing such use." TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 31 (f).
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This impact analysis has now moved a few steps forward. Instead of
focusing only on the welfare costs (or "IP negatives"), 13 the question now
is, if one assumes that the "Western" level of intellectual property
protection enshrined in TRIPS is part of the cause of the successful
innovation produced in the West, then what else is required if a country is
to become a successful innovator (i.e., how to generate "IP positives")? Put
differently, how can opportunities for welfare be created? The focus here is
on an element that is essentially absent from the TRIPS text, namely, how a
developing country can implement not just an intellectual property policy
seen as protecting mostly foreign rights and designed to comply with
TRIPS as if this were an end in itself, but rather a comprehensive
innovation strategy. That is, if intellectual property is an ingredient of the
innovation recipe, what are the other ingredients and how should they be
used?
Initial analytical efforts 14 emphasized the importance of technology
transfer and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). They also underscored the
fact that most of the work on this issue had been done in and for advanced
economies. This naturally begged the question of whether such work could
be exported to different parts of the world and countries at various stages of
development (and, if the answer is negative in at least certain cases, why).
In this essay, I try to make a contribution to the two areas of study
outlined above, and especially the second one, by asking how developing
countries can optimize their innovation potential. I attempt to show that
mechanical implementations of TRIPS are unlikely to generate positives
measured in terms of domestic innovation and may generate significant
administrative and welfare costs. It will become evident that much more
interdisciplinary work is required.
In Part I, I first go back to my earlier work on the "phases" of the TRIPS
Agreement to illustrate how the perceived need for analyses of innovation
strategies and polices emerged in the TRIPS context and how developing an
innovation strategy is now part and parcel of a complete TRIPS
implementation or, in some cases, reimplementation. 15 In Part II, I continue
13. Welfare costs may be considered in aggregate and distributed forms. There may be
aggregate welfare costs that a given society can bear, but, if those costs disproportionally
impact the poor, issues of distributive justice emerge as well.
14. See, e.g., Sir Hugh Laddie, Foreword to COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS,
INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY (2002), available
at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH (Carsten Fink
& Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005); WORLD BANK, THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING
ECONOMIES (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters eds., 1995); Suzanne Scotchmer, The Political
Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 415, 435-36 (2004).
15. According to Article 65.(2) of TRIPS, developing countries other than least-
developed ones, had until January 1, 2000, to comply with most substantive provisions of the
agreement. Almost all of them rushed to "paper comply" with TRIPS, often by adopting
model laws. Countries in which intellectual property was mostly new had relatively few
experts on hand, and their lawyers, judges, and customs authorities needed significant
training. However, there was little time to ask broader questions about how intellectual
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along the path traced in an earlier piece' 6 in which I considered the work of
development economics and its study of the IP/investment/intellectual
property nexus, and I consider insights from other social scientists on
innovation and creativity and how those might inform our conclusions and
recommendations to developing nations and our understanding of the
success of some of them at the global innovation game. In this case, I look
at work done on National Systems of Innovation (NSIs) and, indirectly, the
contribution of systems theory to our understanding of how intellectual
property and innovation interrelate.
In Part III, I offer a few thoughts on how intellectual property rules can
be implemented as part of a broader innovation strategy.
I. THE PHASES OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
A. The Emergence of TRIPS and the Addition Narrative
As I have argued elsewhere, 17 TRIPS is now entering its third phase.
The first phase (TRIPS 1.0) began with a well-documented 18 push by the
U.S. government, supported by the European Commission and the Japanese
government, to link intellectual property and trade rules in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) as part of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, which ended in Marrakesh in April 1994 with the signing of
the Agreement Establishing the WTO, Annex IC of which is the TRIPS
Agreement. Arguably, Phase I did not end with the Uruguay Round. It
continued for a few years after the establishment of the WTO, while a
number of developing countries (very few of whom had been active
participants in the negotiations' 9) began to grasp the detailed scope of their
TRIPS commitments. Phase I of TRIPS was informed by addition
narratives according to which adding high(er) levels of intellectual property
protection to the laws of developing and least-developed nations (a) would
protect the property of intellectual property holders in both rich and poorer
countries (and, by generating additional profits, would in turn lead to more
research and development); and (b) was necessary to jump-start economic
property rules would affect their economies and even less time to harness emerging
scholarship on innovation policies, which itself was only beginning to turn its attention to the
developing world. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; infra note 40 and accompanying
text.
16. See Gervais, supra note 6.
17. See id. at 4.
18. See PETER DRAHOS AND JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2003); GERVAIS, supra note 3, at 11-12; CHRIS MAY, A
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE NEW ENCLOSURES?
(2000); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 96-120 (2003); Andrea Koury Menescal, Those Behind the
TRIPS Agreement: The Influence of the ICC and the AIPPI on International Property
Decisions, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 155 (2005).
19. See Gervais, supra note 6, at 13.
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growth in those countries (intellectual property seen as a necessary
ingredient of development).
B. The Attacks on TRIPS and the Subtraction Narrative
TRIPS 2.0, the second phase in the life of the agreement, began just
before the new millennium. It was characterized initially by highly critical
analyses of the TRIPS negotiation process, which were said to have been
based on coercion of and/or ignorance by (for many developing countries
this was a first complete multilateral trade negotiation, a difficulty
compounded by the lack of intellectual property experts 20), and/or a very
bad bargain for the developing world. The Uruguay Round was the first
example (on such a scale at least) of sectoral reciprocity. To sum it up
rather crudely: the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 21 and
TRIPS in exchange for agriculture and textiles. In addition, developing
countries accepted as part of the Uruguay Round package practically the
full range of preexisting General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
law, in the form of the Tokyo Round codes (other than the Government
Procurement Agreement 22). From this perspective, the "great bargain"
seemed unbalanced. There is little debate but initially at least, the TRIPS
Agreement reduced the welfare of developing countries 23 and that the
TRIPS undertakings 24 turned out to be more costly than anticipated for
developing countries.
Some critics emphasize a coercion rationale to explain the bargain point
to various threats during the Uruguay Round to isolate developing countries
from the global trading system and/or to impose punitive unilateral
sanctions if they did not accede to the demands of the West. 25 Other critics
opine that intellectual property was not proper subject matter for the WT0 26
An extension of this critique sees the Uruguay Round as the last major
multilateral trade negotiations round or at least the last in which the West is
20. Ruth K. Okediji, The Limits of Development Struggles at the Intersection of
Intellectual Property and Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 375.
21. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994).
22. WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs -e/legal e/gpr-94-0 l- e.htm.
23. See, e.g., F. M. Scherer, Global Welfare in Pharmaceutical Patenting, 27 WORLD
ECON. 1127, 1127-42 (2004).
24. J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, Implementation of Uruguay Round
Commitments: The Development Challenge, 23 WORLD ECON. 511, 511-25 (2000).
25. Put differently, TRIPS was perceived by a number of developing nations as a lesser
evil than isolation and loss of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. See Bernard Hoekman,
Services and Intellectual Property Rights, in THE NEW GATT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES 113 (S. M. Collins & Barry P. Bosworth eds., 1994).
26. JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, IN DEFENCE OF GLOBALIZATION 182-85 (2004). Dr. Jagdish
Bhagwati's criticism seems to insist mostly on the fact that TRIPS is not proper subject
matter for the WTO.
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able to obtain more than it concedes to the developing world, specifically
because of the WTO's foray into the atypical area of intellectual property
and the developing world's reaction to it.
However, several critiques underscored the absence of empirical data to
justify the additional narratives. They also rejected the transfer of (partly)
empirically based justificatory theories 27 from industrialized to developing
nations. In parallel, many of them tried to demonstrate the inadequacy of
Western intellectual property norms to protect certain forms of traditional
medicinal knowledge or traditional cultural expressions (sometimes referred
to jointly as "traditional knowledge"). 28  This discourse led to a
recommendation that TRIPS should be resisted and new norms developed.
Phase II was thus informed by subtraction narratives: in short, the lesser
the impact of TRIPS, the better the situation of developing countries would
be.29 Phase II debates also insisted on coalescing to develop alternative
norms in other forums, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity30 or
insisted on technology transfers to compensate in part for higher levels of
rent extraction. Phase II was crucial for our purposes, because it began to
confront a fundamental two-prong query, namely, (a) what is the causal
relationship between intellectual property protection and FDI and (b) does
increased FDI necessarily lead to growth in the recipient economy's
innovation and its overall development? This query is important because it
targets the major underpinning of much of the prointellectual property
discourse.
Not surprisingly, multilateral norm-making designed to increase
protection levels (and reduce some of the flexibilities that remain in the
TRIPS Agreement) became increasingly difficult. After the outbreak of the
debate between several African and Latin American countries, on the one
hand, and pharmaceutical companies, on the other, and the companies' ill-
advised attempt to enforce patent rights in the face of thousands of patients
27. For example, they rejected intellectual property as a natural property right in
ideational goods or as an essential instrumental tool to achieve growth. See Daniel Attas,
Lockean Justifications for Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THEORIES
OF JUSTICE 29-56 (Axel Gosseries et al. eds., 2008). This was also seen as the
(unwarranted) export of intellectual notions developed in the West, by Immanuel Kant,
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, John Locke, and others. See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59
STAN. L. REV. 257, 283-85, 312-31 (2006). Madhavi Sunder notes, "[i]ntellectual property
originalists looking backwards miss the revolutionary social and technological changes afoot
in this century. We are witnessing historic changes in our traditional notions of who the
creators and innovators of culture are, or ought to be." Id. at 331.
28. See generally J. MICHAEL FINGER & PHILIP SCHULER, POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE:
PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2004). On possible
solutions within the TRIPS framework, see Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge &
Intellectual Property: A TRIPS-Compatible Approach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 137, 166.
29. For a detailed discussion of how Egypt's pharmaceutical industry and access to
medicines was done more harm than good by TRIPS, see BASMA I. ABDELGAFAR, THE
ILLUSIVE TRADE-OFF: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATIONS SYSTEMS AND
EGYPT'S PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 15-23 (2006) (discussing the emergence of TRIPS).
30. Convention on Biological Diversity, http://www.cbd.int/convention/convention.
shtml (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
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unable to afford antiretroviral therapies, increasing multilateral levels of
patent protection became practically impossible, at least for the predictable
future. 31  Initial suggestions in the Doha Round to strengthen the
enforcement section of TRIPS and incorporate two treaties negotiated in
1996 under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) 32 dealing with copyright on the Internet were all but abandoned.
Efforts in WIPO to negotiate new treaties (e.g., on database protection,
harmonization of substantive patent law, rights of broadcasters and
webcasters) have confronted strong opposition, in particular from
developing countries. As an additional sign of the shift brought about by
Phase II, while the WTO attempted to address some of the concerns raised
by the developing world (e.g., by allowing the TRIPS Council to work on
the relationship between TRIPS and the CBD and insisting on documenting
compliance with the industrialized countries' technology transfer
obligations), WIPO started work on a development agenda33 designed to
align the organization's work with the interests of the developing world. As
of this writing, 34 work on the agenda was continuing, but its fate and the
measurable substantive outcome of the discussions remained uncertain. It
is equally important to note, however, that during the second phase, the
TRIPS demanders did not abandon their efforts to continue to increase the
international intellectual property baseline. Rather, they began using their
political ammunition in bilateral negotiations to negotiate trade and
investment treaties. Recent bilateral agreements signed by the European
Union and the United States35 almost always contain "TRIPS Plus" norms,
including undertakings by developing countries not to use specific TRIPS
31. Recent measures announced by the governments of Thailand and Brazil tend to
demonstrate that the issue is far from resolved. For example, Brazil granted a compulsory
licence to import a cheaper generic version of a patented drug to treat AIDS. See Brazil
Breaks HIV-Drug Patent After Failed Negotiations with Pharmaceutical Giant Merck,
NoTISUR-S. AM. POL. & ECON. AFF., June 8, 2007, available at
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary-0286-31364472_ITM.
32. World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Diplomatic Conference on
Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Dec. 20, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 65; WIPO,
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65.
33. WIPO General Assembly, Proposal by Argentina and Brazilfor the Establishment of
a Development Agenda for WIPO, WO/GA/31/ 11 (Aug. 27, 2004); see also WIPO General
Assembly, Report on the Thirty-First (15th Extraordinary) Session, 33-37, WO/GA/31/15
(Oct. 5, 2004). This proposal was joined by twelve other member states (Bolivia, Cuba,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Iran, Kenya, Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Tanzania, and Venezuela). See WIPO, Report of the First Session of the Provisional
Committee on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda, Provision 2 & Annex,
PCDA/1/6 (Feb. 20-24, 2006).
34. This essay went to press in March of 2009.
35. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Bilateral Trade Agreements,
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/BilateralUSectionIndex.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2009); Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 867-68
(2007).
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flexibilities. 36 The measures to "rebalance" TRIPS multilaterally do not
seem very effective in bilateral discussions.
C. Ongoing Implementations and Reimplementations: The Calibration
Narrative
TRIPS has now entered a third phase (TRIPS 3.0), one that is informed
by calibration narratives. TRIPS is no longer seen rather simplistically as a
huge negative, and the prospect that TRIPS might be somehow "repealed" 37
is widely seen as unrealistic. The components of this calibration process
are many: (a) the recognition that developing countries are very different
and consequently may need different implementations of TRIPS, instead of
"cookie cutter" norm implants; (b) the recognition that below certain
developmental thresholds, the introduction of high levels of intellectual
property protection will not generate positive impacts (as was evidenced by
the extension of transitional periods available for least-developed WTO
members); (c) the recognition that intellectual property protection is
necessary to develop innovation and foreign direct investment (including
technology transfers) but in itself is insufficient to achieve developmental
objectives; (d) consequently, the recognition that any complete TRIPS
implementation must form part of a broader strategic initiative; and finally
(e) the recognition that the sudden introduction of high levels of protection
and enforcement may induce significant welfare impacts, which must also
be managed.
This multifaceted calibration effort is a reflection of the fact that the
negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement incorporated intellectual property in
36. See SISULE F. MUSUNGU & CECILIA OH, THE USE OF FLEXIBILITIES IN TRIPS BY
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CAN THEY PROMOTE ACCESS TO MEDICINES? 8 (2005), available at
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/TRIPSFLEXI.pdf
37. See, e.g., Martin Kohr, The WTO, the Post Doha Agenda and the Future of the Trade
System: A Development Perspective, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (2002),
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/mkadb.htm. However, most strong critiques of the
agreement, generally on public health grounds, recognize that it is here to stay. See, e.g.,
Junaid Subhan, Scrutinized: The TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, MCGILL J. MED. 152,
152-59, available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2323529#f
n8-mjm0902p 152. As Junaid Subhan notes,
Criticism of the TRIPS agreement arises on a number of levels. There are those
who criticize the implementation of its provisions in sovereign countries, there
others that criticize the provisions of the TRIPS agreement and there are still
others who criticize its very existence. The subsequent critique of the TRIPS
agreement will be made through the lens of the following neutral principles in
order to make the recommendations as relevant and applicable to the current
situation as possible:
- Access to essential medications is a fundamental human right.
- Intellectual property legislation has been a driving force behind
innovation for commercial purposes.
- The world's primary source of novel and generic drugs has been and will
continue to be the commercial pharmaceutical industry.
- The TRIPS agreement will not be repealed in the near future and will
continue to shape international intellectual property law.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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the trade realm, as one of many areas of trade negotiations. In the trade
world, what matters more is not the protection of private property interests,
but rather the protection of income and investment. 38 Property protection
becomes, as it were, a means to an end. As a result, intellectual property
now has to "square off" against other trade-related rights. At the same time,
all trade-related rights, including intellectual property, must fight normative
battles with non-trade-related rights, such as the right to health and other
human rights. These non-trade-related rights and their intersection with
intellectual property are recognized in Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, both of
which were also specifically mentioned in the Doha Declaration of 2001.
Incorporating the constraints considered until recently exogenous to trade,
such as human rights,39 arguably will be one of the main challenges of the
WTO dispute-settlement system in enforcing TRIPS and other trade-related
norms and standards.40
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION, AND KNOWLEDGE
The title of this part indicates the breadth of the analytical challenges (of
which I can only offer a tour d'horizon). In a nutshell, they boil down to
this: how does intellectual property affect the flows of knowledge, and how
does knowledge correlate with innovation? Related questions involve
finding (and using) appropriate metrics and parsing exogenous constraints.
In terms of output, figuring out how to adjust or calibrate an intellectual
property regime to foster innovation (the whole project could be termed
developing a national innovation strategy) may be the hardest part. Most
WTO members likely will endeavor to cabin any such calibration within the
parameters of TRIPS.41
The backdrop for any calibration effort is likely to be the need to grow an
economy increasingly based on knowledge rather than physical, capital, or
natural resources. Decreasing returns on physical capital in the most
industrialized countries and the outsourcing of manufacturing and, to a
certain degree, product development, mean that the only real engine of
growth will be technological. 4 2
38. In other words, as the three-step test filter for national exceptions to copyright,
design, and patent rights-and to a certain extent, trademark rights-makes plain, what
matters most is not whether an infringement has taken place but whether actual or potential
revenue was lost as a result. The protection of rights is therefore, indirectly at least, tied to a
new harm to the market test.
39. See Daniel J. Gervais, Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Learning to Live
Together, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (Paul L. L. Torremans ed., 2d
ed. 2008).
40. See GERVAIS, supra note 3, at 142-44.
41. See Daniel J. Gervais, Epilogue: A TRIPS Implementation Toolbox, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 527-45.
42. This is a point made as far back as 1957 by Robert M. Solow. In his 1987 Nobel
Prize Lecture, he noted,
[T]he main result of that 1957 exercise was startling. Gross output per hour of
work in the U.S. economy doubled between 1909 and 1949; and some seven-
eighths of that increase could be attributed to 'technical change in the broadest
2009] 2361
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A. National Systems of Innovation
Work on NSIs, the systematic analysis of the factor that allows a country
or region to be globally innovative, considered as a discrete field of study,
emerged in the 1980s, pioneered by Bengt-Ake Lundvall,43 a professor at
the Department of Business Studies at Aalborg University of Denmark and
at Sciences-Po in Paris, France. One of its first foci was naturally
education: innovators in a number of fields generally need the intellectual
tools to understand the existing state of technology in a given field to be
able to innovate. 44
1. Knowledge, Innovation, and Education
The emphasis on education in NSI analyses seems solidly anchored in the
Humboldtian tradition of integrating research and education. 45 In modem
terms, this translates as education aimed at generating innovators (and
innovation). Indeed, at the root of any innovation system is a broader
knowledge system, which "enhances the overall performance of a society
by producing and distributing knowledge resources, which then are used by
the other systems of a society to support their processes and
performances.*"46
Countries developing or revising an NSI should thus devise both long-
term plans to ameliorate education/research linkages and short-term plans to
ensure that "human capital" is available to fuel innovation. This includes
sense' and only the remaining eight could be attributed to conventional increase in
capital intensity.
Robert M. Solow, 1987 Nobel Prize Lecture: Growth Theory and After (Dec. 8, 1987),
available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/laureates/1987/solow-lecture.html
(referencing Robert Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39
REV. ECON. & STATS. 312, 312-20 (1957)).
43. See generally BENGT-AKE LUNDVALL ET AL., NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF PRODUCTION,
INNOVATION AND COMPETENCE BUILDING (2002).
44. See generally id.
45. See generally M. Istvdin & M. Feh~r, The Humboldtian Idea of a University: The
Bond Between Philosophy and the Humanities in the Making of the Modern University, 28
NEOHELICON 33 (2001). For a more policy-oriented take, see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV., EDUCATION POLICY ANALYSIS (2004) [hereinafter OECD REFORM].
Interestingly, Alexander von Humboldt also wrestled with creativity and "came up with the
concept of internalized form-fundamentally the concept of free creation within a system of
rule-in an effort to come to grips with some of the same difficulties and problems that
Cartesians faced in their terms." NOAM CHOMSKY & MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE CHOMSKY-
FOUCAULT DEBATE ON HUMAN NATURE 12 (The New Press 2006) (1971) (quoting Noam
Chomsky). Ren6 Descartes attributed to the "mind" a range of phenomena, including
creativity, that he could not explain according to the mechanical or physical principle. See
Ren& Descartes, Discourse on the Method, in SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 44 (John
Cottingham et al. trans., 1988).
46. Elias G. Carayannis & David F. J. Campbell, "Mode 3": Meaning and Implications
from a Knowledge Systems Perspective, in KNOWLEDGE CREATION, DIFFUSION, AND USE IN
INNOVATION NETWORKS AND KNOWLEDGE CLUSTERS: A COMPARATIVE SYSTEMS APPROACH
ACROSS THE UNITED STATUES, EUROPE, AND ASIA 1, 11 (Elias G. Carayannis & David F. J.
Campbell eds., 2006) [hereinafter KNOWLEDGE CREATION].
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using foreign educational resources. 47 It is not overstating the point to say
that, to compete in a knowledge- and technology-intensive economy,
ideally everyone should have a basic understanding of science, even in high
school. While the aim is not to turn every citizen into a scientist or
innovator, everyone should be reasonably conversant in science to
comprehend an increasingly technology-dependent environment and thus to
participate effectively in debates about major social issues, many and
probably most of which have a scientific component. 48 For the same
reason, it may be desirable to make university education the rule, rather
than the exception for an elite.49
2. Clusterization and Global Networking
If education is a central consideration, it quickly became evident in NSI-
related research that much more was required to optimize the innovation
output of a country or region. 50 One of the key findings was the need for
government to assist in the formation of clusters 5' or networks of
innovation, including universities, private laboratories, and access to
venture capital and other incubation tools.52 This allows products to move
more quickly from basic research to prototyping, but also, and perhaps
more importantly, creates spillover effects and a dissipation of knowledge,
allowing knowledge that a university, company, or other entity is unable or
unwilling to use at a given point in time to be used by others.53 Publicly
funded research may also be used locally more effectively in this way.54
47. See OECD REPORT, supra note 45, at 89-115.
48. Climate change, energy production, and medical research (on ethical and other
levels) come to mind as current examples.
49. This debate is going well past the boundaries of this essay. If education is the
intellectual foundation for much innovation, it is not a true sine qua non, because innovators
without formal education are common. Others have emphasized that education might in fact
limit creativity by imposing strict intellectual self-discipline. As Jean Piaget noted, the
"principle goal of education is to create men who are capable of doing new things, not
simply of repeating what other generations have done-men who are creative, inventive and
discoverers." JEROME S. ARCARO, QUALITY IN EDUCATION: AN IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK
51 (2006) (quoting Jean Piaget).
50. See GERVAIS, supra note 6, at 52-59, 545-46.
51. Clusters are defined here as "concentrations of interconnected companies,
specialized suppliers, service providers, firms in related industries, and associated
institutions." Max von Zedtwitz & Philip Heimann, Innovation in Clusters and the Liability
of Foreignness of International R&D, in KNOWLEDGE CREATION, supra note 46.
52. See DANIEL ROUACH & JEFF SAPERSTEIN, CREATING REGIONAL WEALTH IN THE
INNOVATION ECONOMY: MODELS, PERSPECTIVES, AND BEST PRACTICES 331-42 (2002).
53. See EVERET" M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 333 (5th ed. 2003).
54. The Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3015-28 (1980) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000 & Supp. II 2002); see Gary Pulsinelli, Share and
Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under the Bayh-Dole
Act, 7 MINN. J. L. ScI. & TECH. 393 (2006). Gary Pulsinelli notes that prior to the Bayh-Dole
Act, "[t]he general aim of the agencies was to achieve widespread dissemination of the
results obtained in laboratories operating with federal money and to encourage wide
development and usage through dedication to the public domain and nonexclusive licenses."
Pulsinelli, supra, at 401. He then notes that "[t]he Act encourages small businesses and
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The state-academia-industry triple helix 55 is widely seen as the key to a
successful NSI. Such a model insists on human capital, which loops back
to the central role of education and training.
Government-industry arrangements typically cut across industrial sectors
and link multiple clusters (to optimize knowledge spillover and reuse), and
for the same reasons, little attention is usually paid to a priori
synchronisation of the interaction between the three helices because the
system is designed to be dynamic. 56 Whether in Beijing or Bangalore,
Silicon Valley or Sophia-Antipolis, knowledge clusters consisting of
universities, research centers, industry, and government support create a
technology pull and increase production and, as noted above, spillovers of
knowledge, thereby increasing its usage. 57 They are also better at absorbing
external knowledge and attracting funding.58  This is related to what
Professor Andrew Hargadon termed "idea management strategies" designed
to "link people, ideas, and objects together in ways that form effective and
lasting communities and technologies. '59
An NSI thus aims to enhance the global competitiveness of each country
or region,60 and, in economic turns, ensures that the country or region is an
engine of growth of what has become largely a knowledge-based
economy. 61  In fact, studies tend to correlate higher levels of general
nonprofit funding recipients to patent the results of government-sponsored research by
allowing them to retain title to the inventions if they diligently file patent applications and
promote commercial development of the inventions." Id. at 403.
55. See generally Henry Etzkowitz & Loet Leydesdorff, The Dynamics of Innovation:
From National Systems and "Mode 2" to a Triple Helix of University-Industry-Government
Relations, 29 RES. POL'Y 109 (2000).
56. See David F. J. Campbell, The University/Business Research Networks in Science
and Technology: Knowledge Production Trends in the United States, European Union, and
Japan, in KNOWLEDGE CREATION, supra note 46, at 67, 73.
57. Zedtwitz & Heimann, supra note 51, at 102.
58. See id.
59. ANDREW HARGADON, How BREAKTHROUGHS HAPPEN: THE SURPRISING TRUTH
ABOUT How COMPANIES INNOVATE 6 (2003). Another commentator suggests that "a
network-based idea management tool can be understood as a mechanism for transforming
tacit, intangible human capital into explicit, tangible structural capital. Intellectual capital in
explicit form can be managed, manipulated, and exposed to and combined with other
tangible and intangible resources and objects-people, funds and other ideas, for example.
This is the intended function of idea management." John C. Stratton, Idea Work Style-A
Hypothetical Web-Based Approach to Monitoring the Innovative Health of Organizations, in
Wss 2003: WI/IAT 2003 WORKSHOP ON APPLICATIONS, PRODUCTS AND SERVICES OF WEB-
BASED SUPPORT SYSTEMS 69, 70 (J. T. Yao & Pawan J. Lingras eds., 2003).
60. See Stefan Kuhlmann, Future Governance of Innovation Policy in Europe-Three
Scenarios, 30 RES. POL'Y 953, 954 (2001).
61. LUNDVALL ET AL., supra note 43, at 221-28; see also Helga Nowotny et al.,
Rethinking Science, in KNOWLEDGE CREATION, supra note 46, at 39, 43 ("Not only has
knowledge, in the form of world brands and massive (and instantaneous) data flows, become
the key resource in the global economy, but scientific knowledge, more narrowly defined,
has also been both more highly integrated than ever before and also more widely
distributed.").
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knowledge with a high-quality, dynamic democracy. 62 This is nothing new,
but the scale of changes may induce more than strictly quantitative effects
and certainly brought new players to the table:
Research communities have always been virtual communities that
cross national and cultural boundaries. But their dynamics have been
transformed. Once interaction within these communities was limited by
constraints both physical (the ability to meet) and technical (letters and
telephones); now, as a result of advances in information and
communication technologies, interaction is unconstrained-and
instantaneous.... This shift has been intensified by... new kinds of
knowledge organization-such as thinktanks, management consultants,
and activist groups. 63
Indeed, the research on the clusterization of innovation has factored in a
new reality, namely, globalization. Companies often have or work with
labs in several countries, and knowledge-production teams need not (any
longer) be collocated. While this allows us to consider clusters and
innovation functionally rather than geographically, it poses new challenges
to domestic policymakers, whose views are almost necessarily territorial,
reflecting the nation-state structure. 64  The ability of research and
development to move is both a challenge and an opportunity, however,
allowing new entrants to become players much more rapidly.65
At this juncture, however, as Maz von Zedtwitz and Philip Heimann
rightly note, "innovation is not internationalized uniformly." 66  Basic
research is highly concentrated, which indirectly supports the clusterization
approach to research. 67 Data from 2002 showed that 87.4% of basic
scientific research was concentrated in Europe, Japan, and the United
States.68 The development phase was slightly less concentrated with 73.2%
of activity in the triad.69 This is changing rapidly as China builds major
development centers around Shanghai and research centers around
Beijing.70
62. See FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF
POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (2004), available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page= 130&year=2004 ("[Almong upper
income countries that derive the vast proportion of their wealth from enterprise and
knowledge, 38 are Free and only 3 are Partly Free. Societies that are most successful in
producing wealth are almost uniformly Free.").
63. Nowotny et al., supra note 61, at 41-42.
64. One could engage in a post-Westphalian analysis of the regulation of innovation and
technology, and how a country can take strategic advantage of this tectonic shift, but this is
neither the place not the proper context.
65. LUNDVALL ET AL., supra note 43, at 3-4.
66. Zedtwitz & Heimann, supra note 51, at 101, 104.
67. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
68. Maximilian von Zedtwitz & Oliver Gassmann, Market Versus Technology Drive in
R&D Internationalization: Four Different Patterns of Managing Research and
Development, 31 RES. POL'V 569, 573 (2002).
69. Zedtwitz & Heimann, supra note 51, at 105.
70. Maximilian von Zedtwitz et al., Managing Foreign R&D in China, RES. & TECH.
MGMT., May-June 2007, at 19, 19.
2009] 2365
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The development of local innovation clusters around the world may also
change science itself. Innovation is both a race to find new globally
competitive innovations and to adapt existing innovation to local palates.
Epistemologically, the idea of science as coming from "nowhere," thus
morphs into multiple views of science. 71 There is no longer a purely
objective, "reductionist" view of pure science, 72 as the increasingly
multinational and multicultural patterns of research and development bring
about a dialogic process that gives science (or, more precisely, the
outcomes of research efforts) a subjective view anchored in the values and
expectations of each society, country, or region.73 Naturally, social and
cognitive barriers may need to be overcome, but this process in itself may
be creativity-inducing. 74 Preexisting endogenous constraints become less
significant, and regional autonomy (to determine its own methodology) is
increased. Arguably, this will be a positive only if the "right" decisions
have been made. How does one know? If the initial policy objective were
to increase local innovation, one could argue that innovative output
appropriately measures success.
On a different level, but one with a similar causation pattern, science has
questioned old taxonomies of scientific disciplines. 75 New interdisciplinary
research can emerge faster owing to the fresh look that a massive input
71. See CHOMSKY & FOUCAULT, supra note 45, at 42.
72. Indeed, the de-Westernization of scientific research has several deeper societal
impacts. It might challenge, for instance, what Michel Foucault calls the "apparatuses of
truth." "Each society," he writes, "has its regime of truth ... centered on the form of
scientific discourse and the institutions that produce it." Id. at 168.
73. See id.
74. See Mark Lorenzen & Volker Mahnke, Global Strategy and the Acquisition of Local
Knowledge: How MNCs Enter Regional Knowledge Clusters 5 (DRUID Working Paper No.
02-08, 2002), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/aal/abbswp/02-08.html. ("The costs of
exchanging such knowledge are relatively low within clusters, allowing for frequent face-to-
face meetings and on-site observations. Horizontal knowledge spillovers in clusters occur
between firms that share non-strategic knowledge or, alternatively, engage in strategic R&D
alliances. Hence, direct vertical or horizontal relations between firms may yield both
transfers of existing knowledge, and joint creation of new knowledge. However, both these
types of processes are much more complex than transferring bits of information, and hence
necessitate firms to build mutual trust and common cognitive platforms. This may take
considerable time and investments." (citations omitted)).
75. To quote Heinz von Foerster,
I would recommend to drop disciplinarity wherever one can. Disciplines are an
outgrowth of academia. In academia you appoint somebody and then in order to
give him a name he must be a historian, a physicist, a chemist, a biologist, a
biophysicist; he has to have a name. Here is a human being: Joe Smith-he
suddenly has a label around the neck: biophysicist. Now he has to live up to that
label and push away everything that is not biophysics; otherwise people will doubt
that he is a biophysicist. If he's talking to somebody about astronomy, they will
say 'I don't know, you are not talking about your area of competence, you're
talking about astronomy, and there is the department of astronomy, those are the
people over there,' and things of that sort. Disciplines are an after effect of the
institutional situation.
Interview with Heinz von Foerster, in 4 STAN. ELEC. HUM. REV. (1995),
http://www.stanford.edu/group/SHR/4-2/text/interviewvonf.html.
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from new players, with new cultural and social perspectives, brings to
science. 76 For example, an undeniable net positive of the Internet in that
context is that it allows science to flow worldwide instantaneously.
Researchers with access to the Internet can access patent applications and
both current and past patents from major intellectual property offices, often
at no cost.77 Many scientific journals are available online, though not
always for free. 78 The Internet also feeds the various social imaginaries and
provides new images of what is, and of what is possible. This is crucial
because, as Charles Taylor's insightful analyses have shown,79 a perception
of what is possible widens the array of norms that are realizable. In other
words, people do not fight for utopias, but can move into action for
something they know they can achieve.
The Internet and, more broadly, digital technology, has induced another
innovation-related shift. Scientists and artists used different tools and
generally found it difficult to communicate, let alone work together.
Parallels were sometimes mentioned (between mathematics and music, for
example), and sometimes realized by geniuses (Leonardo da Vinci), but
those were rare, mostly theoretical discussions. This has now changed
dramatically and suggests that one of the foci of education should be biased
toward computer technology,80 because code and computers have become a
horizontal link between art and science. To take a simple example, both
artists and scientists (engineers) use three-dimensional design software.
The future of innovation could bring art and science much closer together.
On the negative side of the globalized innovation ledger, however,
studies also show that physical proximity of researchers facilitates the
exchange of tacit knowledge. 81 It is also harder to regulate decentralized
science. National bans on certain types of research are easily circumvented,
and companies can use their hydra-like structure to escape various tax,
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, http://patft.uspto.gov (last visited Jan. 24,
2009).
78. This is a different debate, but, unless voluntary access mechanisms can be put a in
place though price discrimination or otherwise, a digital version of the appendix to the Berne
Convention, which in its current form allows developing countries to issue compulsory
reproduction and translation licenses of copyrighted material, might be an interesting option.
It is unclear that the appendix would allow countries to use it for material that has been
accessed and licensed online. A number of suggestions, some of them helpful, have been
made in the Access to Knowledge (A2K) context. See, e.g., Treaty on Access to Knowledge
art. 3-12(b)(vi) (Draft May 9, 2005), available at http://www.cptech.org/a2k/a2k-treaty-
may9.pdf. The proposal focuses perhaps too narrowly on administrative issues and
education in the traditional sense.
79. See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 15 (2004).
80. A good example is the Montreal-based Society for Art and Technology. Using the
design of artist Luc Courchesne's "Panoscope," a three-dimensional spherical installation,
the Canadian Space Agency was able to solve an issue concerning the robotized arm of the
U.S. Space Shuttle (sometimes referred to as the "Canada arm"). See Society for Arts and
Technology, http://www.sat.qc.ca/article.php?lang=en&idarticle=479 (last visited Mar. 23,
2009).
81. See Zedtwitz & Heimann, supra note 51, at 106.
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disclosure, or other regulatory constraints, in what Robert Reich terms the
age of "supercapitalism. '8 2
3. Steering Innovation
An NSI can and should not direct, but rather it should steer innovation
based on a realistic assessment of a country's strengths, resources,
constraints, and capabilities. This is based on the assumption that the
government has the ability and vision to play a pastoral role-to set
priorities and, especially in countries where innovation is nascent, to use a
top-down approach without endangering worthwhile grassroots or bottom-
up initiatives.
Universities have a central role to play. As public funding of research is
increasingly inadequate,8 3 higher education institutions and public research
centers have been pushed to look for other sources of funding, including
patents. 84  The delicate balance is how far down a vertical axis of
specificity a government or funding agency should direct the research.8 5
While setting areas of priority is almost inevitable and may in fact be
desirable, there are costs associated with separating scientific research into
discrete, sometimes outdated fields. 86 From this perspective, an optimal
research funding program should be mostly processual in nature and
designed to ensure quality research rather than to deliver specific
government-directed outputs.
Universities and scientists thus face a well-known dilemma. They need
funding, and they know that the intellectual property they produce is
increasingly valuable. Yet the question of the universities' obligations
toward the broader community and the potential negative effects of limiting
access (via licensing policies or otherwise) to university research are real.
The tendency to "title" every research output challenges the idea of science
as a public good.87 An argument often heard in this context is that, if
"intellectual is valuable, it cannot be given away free by open publication in
peer-reviewed journals or at scientific conferences";8 8 however, timing can
greatly alleviate this concern by ensuring that the patent application is filed
82. See generally ROBERT B. REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
BUSINESS, DEMOCRACY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE (2007).
83. In the light of the points made above and the increasing displacement of research and
innovation to developing countries, this may be short-sighted policy indeed for industrialized
countries. See Gervais, supra note 6, at 38-41.
84. For the United States, this is partly mandated by federal law. See generally David C.
Mowery et al., The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment
of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL'Y 99 (2001).
85. See Nowotny et al., supra note 61, at 45 ("[T]he tendency of government to define its
role in research funding in quasi-commercial rather than fiduciary terms [is a concern]. This
attempt to align public-policy with market priorities in research policy.. . is likely to reduce
diversity and creativity.").
86. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
87. See Nowotny et al., supra note 61, at 45-46.
88. Id. at 46.
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prior to the first public disclosure in order to maintain the invention's
novelty. 89 Even so, there is an unquestionably greater risk of enclosure of
scientific knowledge. 90
Before concluding this section, two additional remarks may be useful.
First, on a human level, the emphasis on commercially successful outcomes
will steer funds toward more "promising" projects and toward researchers
with a desire to pursue those projects, potentially harming the culture of
collegiality. 9 1 Second, any complete policy should include a feedback loop
to determine its effectiveness. Innovation-based competitiveness is difficult
to measure due to its multifactorial nature. 92 Among the measurable deltas
would be the increase in patent applications and the economic activity (jobs
might be a useful indicator) generated in R&D. Patent citations are
useful, 93 but "we still lack systematic information about the commercial
revenues or profits generated by patents." 94
To be complete, our overview of NSI issues as they relate to intellectual
property should at least note two potential negatives or complexities of an
NSI. The first is the impact of social norms; the second, the real risk of
adopting intrinsically ineffective measures.
89. Under U.S. law, disclosure less than twelve months before the application is filed is
acceptable under certain conditions. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). In most other countries,
absolute novelty applies, and any disclosure before the application destroys novelty.
90. See Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 279,
283 (2004) ("As private interests take precedence over public concerns, moreover, we argue
that the proliferation of exclusive rights could raise fundamental roadblocks for the national
and global provision of numerous other public goods, including scientific research,
education, health care, biodiversity, and environmental protection. The architects of the new
system evidently have paid little attention to these issues, believing that a clear specification
of strong property rights could establish appropriate incentives for private development of
modalities to advance these and other public activities. In our view, the greater likelihood is
that the privatization of public-interest technologies could in many cases erect competitive
barriers, raise transactions costs and produce significant anti-commons effects, which tend to
reduce the supply of public goods related to innovation as such, and also to limit the capacity
of single states to perform essential police and welfare functions not otherwise available
from a decentralized international system of governance." (footnotes omitted)).
91. Nowotny et al., supra note 61, at 45-46.
92. The well-known World Competitiveness Report published by IMD references 331
variables (criteria). See IMD, WCY Online Version, http://www.imd.ch/research/
publications/wcy/wcy.online.cfm (last visited Jan. 24, 2009).
93. See generally Francis Narin et al., The Increasing Linkage Between U.S. Technology
and Public Science, 26 RES. POL'Y 317, 318, 322, 328 (1997); Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The
NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498m, 2001), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8498.pdf. For a more critical analysis, see generally ADAM B.
JAFFE, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2004).
94. Campbell, supra note 56, at 86.
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4. Social Norms and Innovation
Even with good educational and physical resources, innovation may be
foreign to the groupthink and memes of a community, society, or country.
As Everett Rogers puts it,
Norms are the established behavior patterns for the members of a
social system. Norms define a range of tolerable behavior and serve as a
guide or standard for the behaviour of members of a social system. The
norms of a system tell individuals what behavior they are expected to
perform.
... The most innovative member of a system is very often perceived as
a deviant from the social system and is accorded a status of low credibility
by the average members of the system. This individual's role in diffusion
(especially in persuading others to adopt the innovation) is therefore very
limited.95
He adds, however, that "[c]ertain other members of the system function
a5 opinion leaders. They provide information and advice about
innovations." 96
This is of course difficult to change. It takes time. But, a proactive
government may signal the positive value of innovation, at least in less
threatening fields.97 The aim is to create and/or facilitate the emergence of
what Michel Foucault referred to as the "conditions for radical innovation,"
namely the "common social and intellectual base for the creations of
scientific imagination." 98
5. Inefficient Regulation
Regulations and policies may be inefficient for a number of reasons. I
mention two that are particularly salient in this context. One is the creation
of approval or other reporting and administrative requirements that make
using and/or complying inordinately costly or time-consuming-in short,
red-taping policies and systems to such an extent that any positive aim or
outcome is negated (and use discouraged) by the negatives. The other is
multilevel regulation (and policymaking). For example, a European
innovation system would normally consider the potential existence of
twenty-seven99 NSI, and a number of municipal, subregional, and regional
initiatives in higher education, research, and development. 100 While the
95. ROGERS, supra note 53, at 26.
96. Id.
97. In areas where innovation might clash head-on with religious beliefs, for example, it
may be more difficult. Technologies such as contraception or the debate concerning stem-
cell research in the United States are examples.
98. CHOMSKY & FOUCAULT, supra note 45, at 133.
99. I use the European Union (EU) and its twenty-seven member states as a reference.
100. See generally LIESBET HOOGHE & GARY MARKS, MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE AND
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2001).
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European Union no doubt wants to be competitive in innovation,' 0 1 parts of
the Union (cities, countries, regions, etc.) may also want to compete against
other parts. In addition, there is a serious risk that policies will either
duplicate efforts (which creates some inefficiencies and represents a useless
expenditure of taxpayers' funds) 10 2 or, in worst case scenarios, be
counterproductive by pulling in different directions and likely increasing
compliance requirements. Any good policymaking should consider this
issue and put in place proper coordination structures and processes.
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, NSI, AND INNOVATION
A. Why Develop an Innovation Strategy, Not (Just) an Intellectual
Property Policy
If sufficient and adequate intellectual property protection is but one
ingredient in a complex recipe to achieve innovation-based economic
development, then intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is essential
but, by itself, insufficient to ensure growth. Intellectual property is but one
train in a comprehensive knowledge and innovation policy, and that the
trains of surrounding norms and policies also make it to the station is the
objective to be attained. 10 3  By themselves, intellectual property rules
arguably benefit mostly major owners of intellectual property, who are
largely concentrated in a few highly industrialized countries. 10 4
As we saw in Part I, most of the narratives that try to explain the
emergence of TRIPS 105 focused on the negative context for developing
countries. Not surprisingly, they gave birth to implementation narratives I
categorize as "subtractive" because of their insistence on minimalist TRIPS
implementation. In the meantime, certain lobbies, with the support of key
101. See Kuhlmann, supra note 60.
102. Both factors (budgetary constraints and multilevel governance) are often linked. See
WILLIAM WALLACE & HELEN WALLACE, POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 207
(2005) ("[R]egional expenditure is dominated by strong vested interests, the proposed
increases in expenditure in fields such as innovation and technology may well be rejected in
order to satisfy the interest of net contributors in an austerity budget.").
103. The Arab countries' proposal to WIPO on its development agenda- contained the
following:
As a first step, Member States should be encouraged to and assisted in setting up
national strategies on intellectual property, which identify areas of strength and
weakness in dealing with intellectual property systems. Remedies should be found
for weak areas and areas of strength should be further enhanced with a view to
attaining a successful and efficient functioning of the intellectual property system.
WIPO, Proposal by the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Importance of Intellectual Property in
Social and Economic Development and National Development Programs, Annex, at 6,
WIPO Doc. 1 1M/2/2 (June 14, 2005).
104. According to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 94% of all
privately funded research and development was located in those countries during the 1990s.
See UNITED NATIONS INDUS. DEV. ORG., INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002/2003
(2002), available at http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/import/userfiles/hartmany/12idr-full-
report.pdf.
105. See supra Part I.A-B.
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players, insist on increasing the protection to TRIPS Plus levels in bilateral
and regional discussions. Both approaches are flawed if considered from an
innovation-enhancing perspective. To exploit successfully intellectual
property with a view to maximizing economic growth in areas that are
information and intellectual property intensive and to be able to produce
goods and services with a higher ideational content (which is what
intellectual property rules tend to protect), each country needs a
comprehensive knowledge optimization strategy. This may include using
to the maximum extent TRIPS flexibilities in certain areas, but not in
others. Policymakers, especially those from more advanced developing and
emerging economies, may be well-advised to focus more on developing
domestic innovation than limiting rent-seeking efforts by foreign
multinationals. The latter is a short-term fix in a much more complex,
longer-term effort to establish, maintain, or enhance competitiveness in an
increasingly intangible world trading system. In other words, the adequate
(not minimal) protection of commercially or industrially relevant
knowledge forms part of an optimal strategy. Developing countries will
gain more by integrating TRIPS norms in a broader innovation- and
knowledge-optimization strategy. As with market openness, intellectual
property rules per se are best viewed as a catalyst.
Because WTO members cannot legislate below the TRIPS levels without
incurring the risk of dispute-settlement proceedings under the Dispute-
Settlement Understanding, 06 and because it is unlikely that TRIPS norms
will be diluted in the Doha Round, 10 7 it would seem to be pragmatically
justified to take TRIPS as a given quantity (or constant) of the equation.
The real equation is to determine how the available flexibility in
implementing the agreement should be used and why. This should only be
done as part of a comprehensive NSI design.
B. Elements of a National Strategy
Intellectual property rules per se do not automatically lead to better or
more innovation and (commercially exploited) creativity. By themselves,
106. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994); see also GERVAIS,
supra note 3, at 505-12. One should note that not all countries are equal when it comes to
the Dispute-Settlement Understanding (DSU). The EU and the United States have resisted
applying decisions of the DSU that found their legislation incompatible with their WTO
obligations. The long-standing dispute between the European Union and the so-called
"dollar banana" countries, see Lorand Bartels, The Appellate Body Report in European
Communities--Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries,
WT/DS246/AB/R and Its Implications for Conditionality in GSP Programs (n.d.)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review), is an example, while in the
United States a panel report concerning the incompatibility of exceptions contained in §
I 10(5)(b) of the Copyright Act, issued in 2000, with the DSU remains unimplemented as of
this writing, see Albena P. Petrova, The US.-Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act Dispute
Analysis and Forecasts for Compliance, CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J., Summer 2006, at 43.
107. See GERVAIS, supra note 3, at 46-49.
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they do not even achieve the limited purpose of increasing inward FDI. 0 8
This is what has prompted many developing countries to insist on the
technology transfer part of the TRIPS bargain, which is enshrined in Article
66.2,109 as well as capacity-building under TRIPS Article 67. This is linked
to the quest for an intrinsic equilibrium, measured country by country (even
in the face of uniform multilateral rules), in the way intellectual property
protection is implemented.
Granted, the task at hand is not a simple one. Yet, instead of trying to
turn back the clock of extant liberalization and intellectual property rules, I
suggest that they can be put to good use. There is no room in this essay to
cover all aspects of a comprehensive knowledge-optimization strategy, the
primary purpose of which would be to strengthen a country's economy and
its growth. However, the following paths are probably some of those that
could be followed.
1. Priority Setting and Enhancing Domestic Innovative Capabilities
Based on existing industrial infrastructures, education and research
programs, available natural and human resources, and potential domestic
and regional markets, what are the realistic areas that a country should
prioritize? The primary target of an NSI should not be to generate new
imports, though.they may be useful as indirect technology transfer tools, but
rather to build domestic intellectual-property-generating activities, in part
through foreign investment (which almost always includes a knowledge and
technology transfer component) and technology transfer and acquisition. " 0
Developing WTO members who want to maximize the benefits of TRIPS
(while minimizing negative effects and associated welfare costs) should
apply outcomes of priority-setting exercises and.help provide their domestic
enterprises in those areas with idea management tools.' II
Technology transfers can and should be part of this type of strategy.
Technology transfers are subject to appropriation within the boundaries of
applicable contracts and intellectual property rights. 112 An appropriate
108. See Gervais, supra note 6, at 30-32.
109. It reads as follows: "Developed country Members shall provide incentives to
enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging
technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a
sound and viable technological base." The Council for TRIPS is actively following the
implementation of this provision, notably by requiring reports on technology transfer
initiatives taken by developed countries. See WORLD TRADE ORG., ANNUAL REPORT 13
(2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res e/booksp-e/anrep-e/anrep05-e.pdf. For a
summary of the information provided, see Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Note by Secretariat: Submissions Under Article 66.2 of the TRIPS
Agreement, IP/C/W/431 (Oct. 22, 2000).
110. See Gervais, supra note 6, at 30-40.
111. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
112. See generally Chris Dent et al., Research Use of Patented Knowledge: A Review
(OECD Directorate for Sci., Tech. & Indus. (STI) Working Paper No. 2006/2, 2006),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/16/36311146.pdf.
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research exemption should also be considered. 13  However, innovation
should also be encouraged by providing venture capital and seed
investments funneled through innovation incubators. This type of early
capital to bring innovation to the marketplace is often the most difficult step
for innovators, and appropriate assistance is generally required.
2. Education and Institutional Capacity Building
As I noted at the beginning of Part I, this is probably the most important
aspect once priorities have been set. Education, both in the country and
abroad, is the cornerstone of a viable, long-term knowledge strategy and
economic growth in the information society. Technical education is
necessary to understand the state of the art in any technological field.
Training is also required to understand how to use patent search and other
intellectual-property-related tools.1 14
Initially, a country should pay to send some of its best students to the top
research universities, especially in fields where the knowledge brought back
can directly contribute to the strategy in light of priorities set. This could
include engineering, biology, chemistry, physics, and all other sciences, but
also, in almost all cases, management and law. In science, engineers,
scientists, and technicians are equally important. 115 Financial mechanisms
may be used to ensure that trained graduates will return to their country of
origin; if a country does not have patent protection, it will have a hard time
attracting technology-oriented employers and will have a hard time
retaining nationals that have studied in this area. 1 6 As a second step,
113. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental
Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 81. The scope of that exemption in the
United States is in doubt, however, after Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1360-61
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
114. Patent databases are publicly available. By mining recent patents and published
applications (which typically implies an eighteen-month delay after the initial filing-
unfortunately, in certain industries, much can happen in eighteen months) and providing
copies to local companies with product development abilities, a number of upward
technological steps may be taken fairly rapidly. Of course the obligation to comply with
TRIPS means that if the patent is granted in the developing country in question, the
technology cannot be used directly, and even a reasonable license cannot be obtained;
however, the knowledge could be used, for example, for noncommercial research. As was
noted by the UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, TRIPS Articles 8 and 40 allow
a WTO member to determine an appropriate interface between intellectual property and
competition law. However, many countries that implemented TRIPS recently did not and
still do not have competition legislation.
115. See John H. Barton, New Trends in Technology Transfer: Implications for National
and International Policy, at viii (Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 18,
2007) ("The reduction of inventions to commercial application usually also requires skilled
entrepreneurs and, depending on the particular field, skilled mechanics, lab technicians, or
software writers. Many of the same skills are needed for the thoughtful adaption and
application of a technology developed elsewhere. Hence, a broad range of scientific and
technological skills is absolutely crucial for a nation to participate effectively in the
international technological economy.").
116. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 166, 174 (1994).
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world-class universities and research centers may then be established in the
country, directly or in partnership with major foreign institutions. A
country can hardly invest too much in education.
At a more technical level, training for policymakers, judges, high
officials, and other persons involved in economic development projects
should similarly be organized. It cannot be stressed enough that successful
training program outcomes will depend on selecting the best candidates for
each program, rather than basing decisions on other factors.
The development of educational institutions and services is naturally very
costly. Developing intellectual property institutions such as patent, and
perhaps even more, trademark offices, is essential to be able to benefit from
the international IP regime.117 Developing countries can either delegate
these roles to foreign institutions, a majority of which are located in the
"First World," thereby losing some of their ability to customize the
services, or take the policy bull by the horns-and pay the price. Ideally,
more industrialized nations should fund training and establishing of local
patent and trademark offices, since these offices fulfill an educational role
with local businesses and research facilities. Absent this kind of funding,
another option, used in some parts of Africa for example,"18 is to build
regional offices.
3. Subsidies
Within WTO and other applicable rules, there is room for subsidies in the
form of tax measures or otherwise. Subsidies and publicly funded and/or
supported training, research, and development are essential ingredients of a
successful innovation policy. 119 Subsidies may also be used to attract
foreign investment. By granting merit-based research subsidies or grants to
local creators, a country gives an incentive to local innovators and creators.
By rewarding significant achievements of successful innovators and
creators at, for example, an annual award ceremony, a strong social signal is
sent about the value of creation and innovation-which then functions as an
additional incentive for others. This addresses the potential social norm
barrier. 120
117. As noted in a study by Queen Mary University, "The implementation of
international agreements in poor countries is often hindered through a lack of institutional
structures that would serve as a basis for or facilitate the implementation of new legislation.
In many cases this leads to incomplete implementation or adverse effects .... Queen Mary
University, Impacts of IPR Rules on Sustainable Development 3 (Nov. 2006) (unpublished
report, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
118. See, e.g., The African Regional Industrial Property Organization,
http://www.aripo.org/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
119. See Barton, supra note 115, at 32 ("[T]he subsidy criterion described previously
must be the basis for all national technology policy. It clearly favors strong support for
scientific education and for basic research in areas that are important to the particular nation
and neglected by world technological research. The criterion favors academic research in
areas of local interest, and, where the nation has specific capability, of global interest.").
120. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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4. Foreign Direct Investment
FDI is not an economic panacea, but, in the game of economic growth
and development, it seems a better solution than a simple increase in
imports. FDI generally comes with formal or informal knowledge and
technology transfer and creates more and better local jobs than simple
distributorships. Each country (and many are doing it aggressively already)
should thus market its advantages bilaterally, at international fairs, through
graduate students, etc. It could survey multinational companies operating
in its priority areas to determine their perception of the country's strengths
and weaknesses, address shortcomings identified in the survey, and provide
information on positive aspects that are simply not known in interested
circles.
5. Non-IP Regulatory Adaptation
Based on WTO and other rules and surveys, regulatory shortcomings
should be addressed, including the potential "red tape" barrier. 12 1 "Political
stability, desirable geographic location, adequate infrastructure, human
capacity, functioning legal institutions, enforceable contract rights, open
trade policies, . . . intellectual property protection,"1 22 a competitive tax
system, and access to a qualified workforce will rate fairly high in the list of
FDI preconditions.
These are, of course, only examples of components of a full strategy. I
outline in a different paper several more technical options concerning the
transliteration of specific TRIPS standards in the language of national
norms and regulations. 123 What that paper mostly wanted to demonstrate is
that mechanical implementations of TRIPS are unlikely to generate
positives measured in terms of domestic innovation and may generate
significant administrative and welfare costs. The main point is not to
present a full NSI, but rather to insist the need for a systemic approach, well
beyond the metes and bounds of mere TRIPS compliance.
CONCLUSION
Debates about intellectual property at times sound either religious or
theological. Religious when good is opposed to evil, whether good is very
high or very weak (or no) intellectual property. Theological when the
debate is actually a reasoned discussion. The first two phases of TRIPS,
namely, the addition phase during which developing countries were sold a
high level of intellectual property protection (the TRIPS Agreement), and
the following, subtraction phase, when TRIPS and intellectual property
121. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
122. Kevin Kennedy, The 2005 TRIPS Extension for the Least-Developed Countries: A
Failure of the Single Undertaking Approach?, 40 INT'L L. 683, 699 (2006).
123. See generally Daniel J. Gervais, A TRIPS Implementation Toolbox, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, at 527.
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were resisted as policy negatives, were emblematic of those debates. The
fact is that there is no canonical level of intellectual property protection. If
one accepts intellectual property as (mere) instrumental regulation designed
to optimize the level of innovation and commercialization of new creative
products and inventions, then it is obvious that the level is not only open to
debate, especially when the industrial, cultural, and economic situation of
each WTO member is factored into the equation, but that this level will
evolve and change as circumstances change. If one takes a more theoretical
approach, the same conclusion may be drawn. Natural law rests on John
Locke's proviso about not spoiling and leaving enough for others. 124
Utilitarians looking for an increase in aggregate welfare must also recognize
that balance is required. And, an analysis informed by human rights leads
to a similar conclusion. 125 In all cases, the need for balance and the quest
for an optimum level of protection ensues. Translated into policy terms,
this leads to a calibration analysis, where a country complies with TRIPS
not to avoid disputes at the WTO, but rather to maximize the positives and
opportunities for welfare while reducing welfare costs. This element is not
covered in the TRIPS Agreement, except for rather vague obligations
concerning technical cooperation and technology transfers. 126
Following in the footsteps of a previous effort 127 in which I discussed the
contribution of economic analysis to the optimal implementation of
intellectual property, this essay has discussed the contribution that work on
NSIs and systems theory have made to understand the role of government,
universities, and the private sector in developing innovation, and how those
lessons may be applied by developing countries trying to play the global
innovation game. The task is complex and multifaceted and ideally should
have preceded the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement. However, it is
not too late, far from it, to reimplement TRIPS as part of a structured
innovation policy.
124. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 290, 295 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988)
(1690).
125. See Gervais, supra note 39, at 3.
126. TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 7, 66, 69.
127. See Gervais, supra note 6.
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